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Abstract
Economic conditions at the time of labour market entry can induce wage diﬀ  eren-
tials between workers entering the labour market at diﬀ  erent points in time. While 
the existence and persistence of these entry wage diﬀ  erentials are well documented, 
little is known about their interaction with employees’ mobility behaviour. This paper 
contributes to this research area by analyzing the interaction between job mobility 
and entry wage diﬀ  erentials using German administrative data. The results suggest 
that labour market entrants earning less than the average starting wage are more 
likely to change jobs, directly from employer to employer as well as indirectly via an 
unemployment spell. In addition they are more likely to change occupation. Moreover, 
job mobility tends to reduce the eﬀ  ects of labour market entry conditions, implying 
that job mobility operates as an adjustment mechanism that mitigates entry wage 
diﬀ  erentials. These results hold not only for high-skilled, but also for medium-skilled 
and unskilled workers.
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A number of empirical studies suggests that prevailing economic condi-
tions at the time workers enter the labour market signiﬁcantly aﬀect their
earnings (e.g. Bloom and Freeman, 1986, and Shin, 1994). Whether these
wage eﬀects are persistent has been a widely studied question, yielding
ambiguous results (e.g. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994, Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz, 2008, Harris and Holmstrom, 1982, Welch, 1979).
The standard competitive model implies that the labour market operates
as a spot market, where wages are solely determined by labour demand and
labour supply and thus are equal to the individual’s marginal productiv-
ity. In such a model, labour market shocks at the beginning of a worker’s
career – arising, for example, from variations in the cohort size or business
cycle ﬂuctuations – are temporary and do not lead to long-lasting wage
eﬀects. Alternative economic theories, such as, for example, models of im-
plicit contracts, suggest, however, that diﬀerences in initial labour market
conditions can induce persistent wage diﬀerentials between entry cohorts
(e.g. Harris and Holmstrom, 1982).
Compared to the large body of theoretical and empirical studies on the
existence and persistence of the eﬀects of initial labour market conditions
on wages, research on how conditions at the time of labour market entry
are related to workers’ job mobility remains scarce. Looking at a sample
of Canadian college graduates, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008)
provide one of the few studies analyzing the impact of job-starting condi-
tions on worker’s early career. They document that the unemployment rate
at job entry, diminishing the worker’s starting wage, signiﬁcantly raises the
probability of job separation. Furthermore, they provide descriptive evi-
dence that this increased job mobility in turn positively aﬀects wages, and
therefore is able to partly reverse the earnings losses experienced through
less favourable career starting conditions. In a related vein, we study the
relationship between economic starting conditions and early job mobility
addressing two questions: (i) Do wage diﬀerentials induced by initial con-
ditions signiﬁcantly aﬀect an individual’s mobility decision, and (ii) does
job mobility act as adjustment mechanism in such a way as to reduce these
initial wage gaps?
In order to answer these questions, we employ a large administrative
data set representing 2% of German employees. Our analysis proceeds in
three steps. First, we quantify the impact of economic conditions on the
wages of labour market entrants. Second, we examine the determinants of
4individual job mobility, emphasizing the eﬀect of entry conditions. Finally,
using an instrumental variable approach we analyse to what extent worker
mobility contributes to the mitigation of entry wage diﬀerentials between
diﬀerent cohorts. In contrast to previous studies that analyze the diﬀerent
potential causes of initial conditions, we concentrate on a more general
approach and focus on pure year eﬀects acting as a proxy for the eﬀects of
entry conditions.
The following analysis contributes to the existing literature in several
ways. First, we are able to distinguish between various destination states,
between voluntary and involuntary job mobility, and between job mobility
with and without a change of occupation. This allows us to provide a
very detailed picture of the eﬀects of initial wage diﬀerentials on diﬀerent
types of job mobility and of the potential of these diﬀerent types of job
mobility to mitigate existing wage diﬀerentials arising through diﬀerent
economic conditions at the time of labour market entry. Second, using an
instrumental variable approach, we are able to identify the causal impact
of these diﬀerent types of job mobility on entry wage diﬀerentials. Finally,
diﬀerently to other empirical studies in this area, which often concentrate
on single sectors or skill levels (see e.g. Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and
Heisz (2008), who concentrate on college graduates), we use a large and
representative sample of labour market entrants in West Germany. This
allows us to consider all sectors of the economy, and to provide a detailed
analysis for diﬀerent skill levels.
The empirical results suggest that wage diﬀerentials induced by labour
market entry conditions play an important role in explaining job transi-
tions. Workers entering the labour market under unfavourable conditions
and earning less than the average starting wage show an increased mobil-
ity compared to workers entering during more favourable times and earning
average or higher-than-average starting wages. Moreover, the wage discrep-
ancies that occur between workers entering the labour market at diﬀerent
points in time decrease with experience. Direct and indirect labour market
transitions further reduce initial wage gaps, implying that job mobility op-
erates as an adjustment mechanism. These results hold for all skill groups
and types of job mobility considered in the analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
contains a review of the literature on initial conditions, cohort eﬀects, and
early job mobility. Section 3 presents a description of the data set, par-
ticularly addressing the identiﬁcation of job transitions. In Section 4 the
methodology used in this paper is discussed. Descriptive statistics and
5estimation results as well as several sensitivity analyses are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Initial Conditions, Cohort Eﬀects and Job Mobility
The analysis conducted in this paper builds on two strands of the liter-
ature: (i) studies on the impact of initial labour market conditions on
earnings, and (ii) the job mobility literature, analyzing the determinants
and wage eﬀects of individual job transitions. In this section, we provide
a brief survey of the existing theoretical and empirical studies for both
strands. Although the subsequent empirical analysis does not concentrate
on the diﬀerent potential sources of entry wage diﬀerentials, our overview
also covers studies providing various explanations for diﬀerences in wages
between entry cohorts.
2.1 Initial Labour Market Conditions and Wages
The economic literature provides several arguments why initial labour mar-
ket conditions might lead to wage diﬀerentials between entry cohorts. Stud-
ies examining the impact of the demographic cycle on earnings ﬁnd that
a considerable increase in labour supply – emanating, for example, from
the entry of baby boomers into the job market – adversely aﬀects entry
wages (Freeman, 1979, and Welch, 1979). The analysis whether these wage
disadvantages remain throughout workers’ careers has created contention
among researchers (Berger, 1989, Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman, 1987,
and Murphy, Plant, and Welch, 1988). Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman
(1987) track the progress of diﬀerent U.S. cohorts from 1969 to 1984. Their
results suggest that large cohorts are able to at least partly catch up in
earnings within a decade after labour market entry. Welch (1979) ﬁnds
similar results for the period from 1967 to 1975 and conﬁrms that wage
disadvantages do not persist as the cohort ages. Berger (1989), however,
using almost identical data but less restrictive assumptions does not ﬁnd
any convergence in wages across cohorts.
Wage diﬀerentials between entry cohorts may also be the result of labour
demand shocks, such as technological progress or business cycle ﬂuctua-
tions. Existing evidence suggests that individuals hired during economic
recessions experience lower entry wages than individuals hired in economic
upturns (e.g. Bils, 1985, Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994, and Martins,
Solon, and Thomas, 2010). Furthermore, several studies indicate that this
6cohort eﬀect is persistent (e.g. Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz, 2008,
Oyer, 2006, and von Wachter and Bender, 2008). Several theories can be
put forward to explain this long-term impact of poor initial economic con-
ditions. Models of implicit contracts, developed for example by Azariadis
(1975) as well as Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and empirically tested by
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994),
suggest that business cycle conditions at the time of labour market entry
may aﬀect individuals’ long-term wages, because of missing or insuﬃcient
wage adjustments. Another type of model focuses on cyclical variations in
hiring and promotion standards, which might lead to diﬀerences in workers’
productivity, and hence to diﬀerences in current and future earnings (Okun,
1973, and Reder, 1955). A prevalent explanation for persistent cohort ef-
fects is based on the human capital model, stating that the initial economic
situation aﬀects workers’ opportunity to accumulate skills and thus has a
sustained impact on individual labour market performance (Gibbons and
Waldman, 2004).
2.2 Early Job Mobility
Workers’ careers - and in particular young workers’ careers - can be charac-
terized by a two-sided search process: Workers search for ﬁrms that value
their skills most highly, while ﬁrms search for the most productive workers
(Jovanovic, 1979). Labour market entrants may not be able to immediately
ﬁnd an employer that oﬀers them the most productive jobs, which implies
that job transitions are an integral part of early working lives (Topel and
Ward, 1992). Thus early job mobility plays an important role in improving
the quality of job matches and hence for the evolution of workers’ wages.
This especially holds true in times of unfavourable economic conditions,
when suitable jobs are particularly hard to ﬁnd. Note, however, that job
transitions as a mechanism to adjust workers’ early wages to average mar-
ket wages are not taken into account by the theories of cohort wage eﬀects
mentioned above.
Empirical studies examining the determinants of job transitions early
in the career suggest that the wage level is crucial for individual mobil-
ity. Topel and Ward (1992), for example, analyze the mobility patterns of
young men and ﬁnd a lower job stability for lower-paid jobs. This corre-
sponds to results reported by Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008),
who show that economic downturns, diminishing workers starting wage,
signiﬁcantly raise the rate of job change. Common explanations for these
7ﬁndings are based on job search (Burdett, 1979) and job matching ap-
proaches (Jovanovic, 1979), which predict a long-lasting catch-up process
if wages have temporarily declined. Thus, workers who do not experience
sustained productivity increases tend to search for better jobs that oﬀer
higher wages and higher match qualities. This implies that employer-to-
employer transitions that occur for voluntary reasons are able to increase
young workers’ wages.
Empirical evidence conﬁrms the beneﬁcial wage eﬀects of voluntary
job mobility which takes place during the early stages of peoples’ work-
ing lives. Antel (1986), and Bartel and Borjas (1978), for example, ﬁnd
mobility-induced wage premiums that range between 8% and 20%. Simi-
larly, the analysis by Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008) indicates
that wage disadvantages, experienced by workers graduating in a recession,
are partly reversed through job changes. This implies that individuals af-
fected by poor initial labour market conditions might use the opportunity
to advance in their careers through job changes, avoiding persistent earn-
ings disadvantages and yielding a convergence between cohort and average
market wages.
Likewise, ﬁrms may eventually lay oﬀ workers who experience relatively
high wages because of favourable starting conditions. This kind of sepa-
ration might lead to a loss of initial wage advantages and therefore also
contributes to a reduction of entry wage diﬀerentials. A prevalent explana-
tion for wage losses of displaced workers is based on human capital theory
(Becker, 1975). It suggests that investments in job-speciﬁc skills create a
higher earnings potential, making job mobility less proﬁtable. Gibbons and
Katz (1991) argue that at the time of hiring, employers are insuﬃciently
informed about workers’ productivity. Since ﬁrms have an incentive to lay
oﬀ less able workers, displacements may serve as a negative signal to other
employers. This adverse selection of job movers implies that involuntary
employer-to-employer transitions may entail negative wage eﬀects, which
has been conﬁrmed by several empirical studies. Kletzer and Fairlie (2003)
and von Wachter and Bender (2006), for example, point to the fact that
job displacements in workers’ early careers lead to sizeable and persistent
wage losses. Similarly, von Wachter and Bender (2008) show that initial
wage advantages, obtained from favourable labour market conditions, are
reduced when workers lose their job. There are only very few papers (e.g.
Antel, 1986, and Perez and Sanz, 2005) which analyze voluntary and in-
voluntary job changes simultaneously and thus allow for both beneﬁcial as
well as unfavourable mobility.
83D a t a
In the following analysis we employ the IAB Employment Sample (IABS),
a data set provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The
IABS is a 2% representative sample of the Employment Statistics Register,
an administrative panel data set of the employment history of all individ-
uals in Germany who worked between 1975 and 2004 in an employment
relationship covered by social security, supplemented with information on
all unemployment spells of the workers covered. For 1995, the Employment
Statistics Register contains the labour market history of 79.4% of all em-
ployed persons in Western Germany, and 86.2% of all employed persons in
Eastern Germany.1
The data set provides information on gross daily wages subject to social
security contributions, which we deﬂate using consumer prices (base year
2000). Further worker characteristics included are the employees’ year of
birth, sex, nationality, and education. To meet the problem of inconsistent
and missing information on the individual’s education, we corrected the
education variable following an imputation procedure provided by Fitzen-
b e r g e r ,O s i k u m i n o ,a n dV ¨ olter (2006).2
The sample is restricted to West-German individuals who started their
career between 1980 and 1999, because the record on unemployment beneﬁt
recipients are unreliably measured before 1980. We analyze the career
paths of these individuals in their ﬁrst ﬁve years on the labour market. For
a better comparison of wages, part-time workers, homeworkers, trainees,
and individuals with parallel employment spells have been excluded from
the analysis. For each entry cohort we trim wages at the 1st and 99th
percentiles and leave unconsidered starting wages close to the contribution
ceiling.3 Finally, we drop individuals with missing values for the variables
1The employee history is based on the integrated notiﬁcation procedure for health insurance,
the statutory pension scheme, and unemployment insurance. At the beginning and at the
end of any employment spell, employers are required to notify the social security agencies.
This information is exact to the day. For spells spanning more than one calendar year, an
annual report for each employee registered within the social insurance system is compulsory,
and provides an update on, for example, the qualiﬁcation and the current occupation of the
employee. Civil servants and self-employed workers are not included in the data. A detailed
description of the Employment Statistics Register and the notiﬁcation procedure is given by
Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000).
2Particularly, we use the imputation procedure 2B by Fitzenberger, Osikumino, and V¨ olter
(2006), where education reports are extrapolated if a person’s education sequence is consistent,
i.e. non-decreasing over time.
3Other studies based on administrative individual data are usually subject to the problem
that the wage information in the IABS is censored at the social contribution ceiling. Because
we only consider individuals entering the labour market for the ﬁrst time, these data problems
barely aﬀect our analysis: Less than 0.4% of the workers’ starting wages are top coded. Within
9used in the empirical analysis. Applying these selection criteria, our ﬁnal
sample comprises 195,384 labour market entrants with a total of about 1.3
million spells.
The IABS is representative regarding employment covered by the social
security system but not regarding unemployment, because only those un-
employed who are entitled to transfer payments are covered.4 The available
information allows to derive three labour market states at each moment in
time: employment covered by social security (E), unemployment (U), if
the worker is receiving transfer payments, and non-participation (N). Since
the latter state cannot be directly observed, we deﬁne non-participants as
individuals leaving the sample. Therefore, transitions to non-participation
include also transitions to the civil service, to self-employment, retirement
or marginal employment, because these destinations are not covered by so-
cial security legislation and are therefore not covered by the Employment
Statistics Register.
Since the IABS data set contains daily information on the employment
and unemployment history of every individual in the sample, it is possible
to calculate separation ﬂows taking into account every change of the labour
market state that occurs within a certain time period. Using the establish-
ment identiﬁcation number provided in the data set, we are able to identify
three diﬀerent separation ﬂows: transitions (i) from employment to non-
participation (EN), (ii) from employment to unemployment (EU) and (iii)
from employment to another employment relationship (EE). As ﬁrms and
workers may fail to correctly report the beginning and the end of a job or
of a period of unemployment, we disregard small gaps in the records. In
particular, we deﬁne a direct transition between two labour market states if
the time lag between two spells (employment or unemployment) is smaller
than 30 days. It should be noted that our deﬁnition of a job is based on
the establishment level rather than on the ﬁrm level. Hence, transitions
from one establishment to another one within the same ﬁrm are treated as
employer-to-employer ﬂow.
Concerning EE ﬂows, research has pointed out that a distinction be-
tween voluntary and involuntary job changes proves to be important (Antel,
the ﬁrst ﬁve years of labour market experience about 3% of the workers reach wages aﬀected
by the contribution ceiling.
4For example, workers who fail to report to the unemployment oﬃce are not counted as
unemployed even if they have been laid oﬀ and are looking for a job. The same is true for workers
who, during the two years prior to unemployment, have worked for less than 12 months in a job
covered by social security legislation. Also, workers can be temporarily denied unemployment
beneﬁts for diﬀerent reasons (e.g. unjustiﬁed job quits, failure to take up an acceptable job),
and are not recorded as unemployed for periods of non-receipt of beneﬁts.
101986). Since the IABS data do not designate any reason for a job separa-
tion, we are not able to directly diﬀerentiate between voluntary and invol-
untary moves. As an alternative, we follow previous studies (e.g. Perez and
Sanz, 2005) and compare direct employer-to-employer transitions and those
with an intervening unemployment spell of less than 1 month (EED)t o
employer-to-employer transitions with an intervening unemployment spell
that is larger than 1 month (EEID).5 Corresponding to the notion in the
job mobility literature, the ﬁrst type of separation is most likely initiated
by the worker and therefore interpreted as a voluntary move. The latter
one, however, results most likely from a lay-oﬀ and is considered to be




In the ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis, we estimate the probability of
experiencing diﬀerent types of job transitions Eiet by using a standard
probit model:





where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In
order to obtain a general idea of young workers’ mobility behaviour, we
analyze transitions from one employer to another (EE), from employment
to unemployment (EU), and from employment to non-participation (EN).
With respect to employer-to-employer transitions, we diﬀerentiate between
direct employer changes (EED) and indirect employer changes (EEID)a s
described in the previous section. Xit is a vector of individual charac-
teristics, including gender, skill level, and employment duration, and Zet a
vector of establishment characteristics, including establishment size and in-
dustry dummies. In order to account for diﬀerences in economic conditions
5Our data set only records unemployment spells if the worker receives unemployment bene-
ﬁts. We are thus not able to identify the true length of unemployment. Following Fitzenberger
and Wilke (2006), we therefore use the nonemployment period as a proxy for the true un-
employment period, which is deﬁned as all nonemployment spells after an employment spell
including at least one period with receipt of transfer beneﬁts.
6Using this deﬁnition, job separations induced by the employer might be considered as
voluntary moves. This is possible, for example, if the employer notiﬁes the worker in advance
that he will be laid oﬀ, giving him the opportunity to search on-the-job. We therefore view our
measure of voluntary transitions as an upper bound.
11at the time of separation, we include year dummies (Tt).
The explanatory variable of main interest is the wage eﬀect of labour
market conditions at the beginning of the worker’s career (Ci). In order
to calculate these initial wage diﬀerentials, we estimate the following wage
regression using OLS:
lnwi0 = α0 + α1Xi0 + α2Ze0 +
J 
j=2
δjCj +  i0, (2)
where lnwi0 refers to the real daily log wage of individual i at the time
of entering the labour market (t=0), Xi0 is a vector of individual char-
acteristics, and Ze0 a vector of establishment characteristics. The vectors
α0, α1, α2,a n dδj are parameters to be estimated. Cj denotes a set of
j − 1 dummy variables indicating the year an individual enters the labour
market. These variables constitute a summary measure of the conditions
prevailing at the time of labour market entry which include, for example,
business conditions and the size of the cohort entering the labour market in
a given year. The coeﬃcients δj obtained from estimating equation (2) by
using an arbitrarily chosen reference year, are transformed into percentage
deviations from the grand mean of starting wages following Jann (2005).
Using these starting wage deviations, we constructed the two variables CA
i
and CB
i , comprising entry wages larger and smaller than the average en-
try wage across the period under study, respectively. Both variables enter
equation (1) in absolute values. By using CA
i and CB
i , we allow positive
and negative deviations to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the transition probabil-
ities.7 Table A.1 provides deﬁnitions as well as summary statistics of all
worker and establishment characteristics used in the empirical analysis.
4.2 Development of Entry Wage Diﬀerentials
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether job
mobility contributes to a decrease in the initial wage diﬀerential between
labour market entrants across years within the ﬁrst ﬁve years of their labour
market career. The analysis concentrates on individuals who stayed in their
ﬁrst job and individuals who change employers either directly or indirectly.
The eﬀect of these diﬀerent types of job mobility on entry wage diﬀerentials
7Since predicted variables are included as regressors, standard errors are corrected following
Murphy and Topel (1985).
12is analyzed by estimating the following model:


















i5 +  i5.
(3)
Unlike in model (2), we now examine the workers’ wages ﬁve years after
their labour market entry (t=5). Moreover, equation (3) extends model
(2) by including two dummy variables EED
i5 and EEID
i5 , which indicate
whether only direct or only indirect employer changes took place in the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of labour market experience. In order to gauge the wage
eﬀect of mobility for workers entering the labour market in diﬀerent years,
we interact these two indicator variables with the entry year dummies Cj.
The failure to control for the simultaneous determination of wages and
mobility may result in biased and inconsistent estimators (Abowd, Kra-
marz, and Roux, 2006, Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, and von Wachter and
Bender, 2006). We address the possible endogeneity of changing employ-
ers by using an instrumental variable approach. We exploit the idea that
workers are pulled into new jobs due to improved outside job opportuni-
ties, while they are pushed out of their current job because of worsened
economic conditions (McLaughlin, 1991). In order to do so, we use the
annual industry employment growth rate as an instrument for the proba-
bility of voluntary mobility, arguing that more job openings are available
in growing industries, which positively aﬀects the likelihood of a voluntary
job change, and that workers are more likely to change jobs within the same
industry due to industry-speciﬁc human capital.8 Following Goeggel and
Zwick (2009), who analyze the job and wage mobility behaviour of German
apprentices, we further use a mass- layoﬀ indicator as an instrument for
the probability of involuntary job mobility. Using the establishment size re-
ported in the IABS data set, we deﬁne mass layoﬀs as an annual reduction
of the establishment’s labour force by more than 30 percent. It is assumed
that workers are more likely to leave the job involuntarily if the employ-
ment in their establishment was reduced signiﬁcantly in the year of sepa-
ration. It seems plausible to argue that both instruments are uncorrelated
to unobservable individual characteristics aﬀecting wages. Furthermore, as
shown in Section 5.4, the industry employment growh rate as well as the
8Growth rates are calculated by using oﬃcial ﬁgures on industry-speciﬁc employment pro-
vided by the German Statistical Oﬃce.
13mass-layoﬀ indicator are highly correlated with the workers’ likelihood to
change employers directly and indirectly, respectively, making them strong
instruments.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Entry Wage Diﬀerentials
Before we turn to the impact of initial labour market conditions on workers’
mobility behaviour and the role of job mobility in adjusting wage diﬀeren-
tials, we show the pattern of initial wage gaps as well as the evolution of
wages over time for workers entering the labour market in diﬀerent years.
Figure 1 plots the development of average log real daily wages for the co-
horts starting their career between 1980 and 1999. It additionally shows
the workers’ average wages at the time of labour market entry as well as
ﬁve years later. The ﬁgure reveals that average starting wages vary signiﬁ-
cantly across workers entering the labor market in diﬀerent years. However,
the observed entry wage diﬀerentials appear to decrease slowly over time.
As mentioned in Section 2, cohort wage eﬀects at the time of labour
market entry might be the result of labour demand shocks. The relation
between this type of shock and average entry wages is shown in Figure 2,
which compares detrended average starting wages with variations in the
business cycle. It is evident that wages at the time of labour market entry
follow the GDP growth rate. A simple correlation analysis shows that the
correlation between entry wages and the GDP growth rate rises from 0.01
when using the contemporary GDP growth rate to a maximum of 0.50
when using the GDP growth rate lagged by two years.
The observed variations in starting wages may not solely be driven by
diﬀerences in labour market entry conditions, but also by variations in the
composition of the worker groups entering the labour market in diﬀerent
years. The corresponding summary statistics, which are reported in Table
A.2, show that workers entering in diﬀerent years only diﬀer slightly in
observable characteristics (share of females, share of skill groups and co-
hort size). This issue is examined explicitly in Table 1, which presents the
entry year eﬀects obtained by estimating several speciﬁcations of equation
(2). With the exception of workers entering the labour market in 1990,
worker groups entering in all years earn starting wages that signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from the average entry wage in the period under study. For example,
workers starting their working career in 1980 earn 21.4% less than the aver-
14age, while entrants in 1999 have starting wages 21.3% above the average.9
Taking into account observable individual (skill level, gender) and estab-
lishment characteristics (industry, region, establishment size) reduces the
estimated year eﬀects (see column (2) of Table 1). Column (3) of Table 1
shows that the wage diﬀerentials between entry cohorts are further reduced
when we control for a linear time trend in addition to composition eﬀects.
Despite these additional controls, however, entry wage diﬀerentials remain
statistically signiﬁcant ranging from -11% in the year 1984 to almost 15%
in 1992.
5.2 The Impact of the Initial Wage Gap on Job Mobility
Table 2 displays separation transitions by labour market experience and the
position in the distribution of entry wage diﬀerentials, to illustrate the job
mobility behaviour of individuals aﬀected by diverse starting conditions. In
general, transition rates are decreasing with the individual’s labour market
experience. Furthermore, workers of the lower quintiles of the distribution
of entry wage diﬀerentials tend to be more mobile at the beginning of their
career. For example, two years after labour market entry, workers with
starting wages below the average show employer-to-employer (EE) tran-
sition rates ranging from 33.2% to 27.9%, while the respective transition
rates of workers whose entry wage lies above the sample mean only reach
about 23.4% to 25.2%. Transitions from employment to non-participation
(EN) show a very similar pattern. For employment-to-unemployment tran-
sitions (EU), however, slightly diﬀerent properties can be observed. Work-
ers with starting wages near the average entry wage and those with positive
deviations from the average entry wage seem to have the lowest transition
rates, varying from 9.4% to 9.8% two years after labour market entry, while
workers with negative deviations from the mean entry wage show relatively
higher inﬂows to unemployment, ranging from 10.3% to almost 15%.
Table 2 further shows the transition rates for direct (EED) and indirect
employment changes (EEID). Direct EE ﬂows are again higher for workers
from the lower quintiles of the entry wage distribution. Moreover, EE
ﬂows with an intervening nonemployment spell increase with negative wage
deviations and are least likely to occur for workers with starting wages near
or above the average entry wage. Overall, Table 2 suggests that individuals
with entry wages below the average entry wage tend to be more mobile.
9The probability to enter the labour market follows a strongly procyclical pattern. Therefore
we argue that the estimated wage losses constitute a lower bound of costs due to unfavourable
starting conditions, as the costs of an increased unemployment probability would add.
15Table 3 reports the marginal eﬀects obtained from estimating two spec-
iﬁcations of a probit model for the three separation ﬂows EE, EN, and
EU: (i) a basic speciﬁcation described in equation (1) (see columns (1),
(3) and (5)), and (ii) an extended speciﬁcation, which includes also inter-
action variables of entry year eﬀects with worker’s employment duration
(columns (2), (4) and (6)). The results are generally in line with the liter-
ature on job mobility. The estimation results also show that employment
duration negatively aﬀects the likelihood of separating. This negative du-
ration dependence may be attributed to the fact that longer tenure is often
associated with a better worker-ﬁrm match quality. The result that women
face a signiﬁcantly lower risk of job separation than men, irrespective of
the destination state, is, however, not in line with other studies on labour
market ﬂows, which in general ﬁnd women to be more mobile than men,
and to be more likely to transit from employment to unemployment or
nonparticipation, usually because of maternity leave and child care. For
our sample, consisting of job starters, these factors appear not to be as
important as in a representative sample of female employees.
Concerning the impact of the entry wage gap on transition probabili-
ties, the estimation results largely conﬁrm the results from the descriptive
analysis. The probability of an EE or EN ﬂow is increasing with negative
and decreasing with positive entry year eﬀects. The marginal eﬀects in
the second speciﬁcation indicate that the higher EE and EN mobility of
workers facing a negative entry wage gap is even larger at the beginning of
their career and then gradually declines with employment duration, while
the lower EE and EN ﬂows for workers with a positive entry wage gap is de-
creasing with increasing tenure. A diﬀerent pattern occurs for the outﬂows
to unemployment. Here the estimation results indicate that positive entry
year eﬀects do not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the transition
probability. Negative entry year wage diﬀerentials, however, signiﬁcantly
increase the probability of moving into unemployment. Overall, our es-
timation results indicate that workers entering the labour market during
poor economic conditions tend to be more mobile, which is in line with the
evidence presented by Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008).
The coeﬃcients obtained from estimating the probability of changing
jobs directly and indirectly as well as with and without a change in oc-
cupation for all workers and for the sup-samples of workers with diﬀerent
skill-levels are shown in Table 4. Positive entry year eﬀects signiﬁcantly
reduce the likelihood of direct employer-to-employer transitions: referring
to the whole sample, a one percent increase of the positive entry year eﬀect
16lowers the transition probability by 0.11%. This negative eﬀect appears
for all three skill-levels we distinguish in our analysis. Arguably, labour
market entrants aﬀected by advantageous economic conditions and earning
wages above the average have a lower incentive to search for better-paid
jobs. The probability of changing employers through a nonemployment
spell, however, is signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀected by positive entry year
eﬀects only for low-skilled workers. Diﬀerentiating employer changes that
occur with (EEOM)a n dw i t h o u t( EEOS), a change in occupation shows
that the latter is not aﬀected by a positive wage gap. Employer changes
that are associated with an occupational change, on the other hand, are
signiﬁcantly lower for individuals with positive entry wage gaps (at least
for the low- and medium-skilled).
Negative entry year eﬀects, on the other hand, are positively correlated
with direct employer-to-employer transitions for all skill-groups and with
indirect employer-to-employer transitions for the high-skilled. Considering
all workers, an increase of the negative wage diﬀerential by one percentage
point increases the likelihood of direct and indirect transitions by 0.33% and
0.16%, respectively. Finally, Table 4 indicates that both, employer changes
with and without an accompanied change of the occupation, increase with
a negative entry wage diﬀerential.
Overall, these results indicate that workers entering the labour market
during unfavourable economic situations and earning less than the aver-
age entry wage, might feel underpaid and may accept jobs in occupations
that do not ﬁt their preferences. These workers have a relatively high in-
centive to search for better jobs, and are relatively more likely to switch
jobs without an intervening nonemployment spell and with and without an
occupational change.
5.3 Adjustment of Entry Year Eﬀects
To examine the eﬀect of job mobility on entry year wage diﬀerentials over
time, we compare wages and wage growth between stayers and movers ﬁve
years after labour market entry. Stayers are deﬁned as workers who stay
in their ﬁrst job. Movers are classiﬁed into the following groups: workers
who change jobs within the ﬁrst ﬁve years of their labour market career (i)
directly, (ii) indirectly, (iii) directly as well as indirectly, and (iv) with and
without a change in the occupation.10 The distribution of the individuals
10By this deﬁnition, workers are allowed to switch employers several times within the ﬁrst
ﬁve years. Restricting the sample to workers who changed jobs only once leads to very similar,
but slightly reduced eﬀects.
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Table 5 presents the results of estimating the log wage on a constant
and four dummy variables indicating whether the entry wage diﬀerential
of an individual is in the ﬁrst, second, fourth or ﬁfth quintile of the distri-
bution of entry wage diﬀerentials. It indicates that entry wage diﬀerentials
decrease strongly with labour market experience and that this mitigation
of entry wage diﬀerentials is facilitated by job mobility. For example, at the
time of labour market entry, workers in the ﬁrst quintile of the distribution
of entry wage diﬀerentials earn 0.71 log points (around 51%) less than those
who received the average entry wage. After ﬁve years of labour market ex-
perience, this wage gap reduces to 0.20 log points (18%) when staying with
the ﬁrst employer, 0.07 log points (6%) when changing employer directly
and 0.10 log points (6%) when changing employers indirectly. The reverse
pattern could be observed for those who received wages above the average
entry wage when they started their career. For those in the ﬁfth quintile
of the distribution of entry wage diﬀerentials, for example, the initial wage
advantage of almost 56% at the time of entry to those who received aver-
age entry wages reduces to 22% after ﬁve years of labor market experienec
when they stay with their ﬁrst employer, to 13% when they change em-
ployers directly and to 11% when they change employers indirectly. Note
further that the lowest wage convergence could be observed for those who
change both employers and occupations, which may be explained by a loss
of occupation speciﬁc human capital.
These patterns are investigated in more detail by estimating equation
(3) as described in the previous section.11 The estimation results when dif-
ferentiating stayers as well as movers who changed their employer directly
and indirectly are shown in Table 6, while Figure 3 further illustrates the
results. The coeﬃcients reported in the ﬁrst row of this table show the av-
erage eﬀect of staying with the initial ﬁrm, changing jobs directly as well as
changing jobs indirectly. The interaction terms indicate how these main ef-
fects are modiﬁed when we distinguish between workers entering the labour
market in diﬀerent years. Overall, wages of stayers are 3.8% below the aver-
age. This negative eﬀect is even higher for workers who started their career
before 1988, but lower for those who entered the labour market afterwards.
The older entry cohorts, suﬀering from initial wage disadvantages, can ben-
eﬁt from changing employers without an intervening nonemployment spell.
While the main eﬀect of direct job mobility lies at about 3.4%, it is even
11Here we only consider workers who change jobs only directly or indirectly within the ﬁrst
ﬁve years. Those who show both types of job mobility (about 18.000 workers) are not included.
18higher for these earlier years. Workers entering the labour market in ear-
lier years also beneﬁt strongly from changing employers indirectly. One
can observe opposite results for workers who start their career later and
initially earn wages above the average: Compared to the main eﬀect, direct
and indirect job changes imply a lower wage.
Figure 3 shows the estimated entry year eﬀects at the time of labour
market entry and ﬁve years later. After ﬁve years of potential labour mar-
ket experience, the wage diﬀerentials across workers with diﬀerent entry
years have decreased for both, movers and stayers. This reduction is much
stronger when workers change their employers, suggesting that job mobil-
ity is an important mechanism for wage convergence across entry cohorts.
For example, the 11.1% wage disadvantage of workers who started their
career in 1984 and stay in their ﬁrst job is reduced to 7.9%, while direct
and indirect movers experience a reduction of their initial negative wage
diﬀerentials to 3.6% and 0.8%, respectively.
Figure 4 illustrates the wage convergence when diﬀerentiating between
staying, employer changes that are associated with an occupational change
and employer changes without an occupational change. Again, entry wage
diﬀerentials appear to be mitigated over time with wage convergence being
stronger for movers than for stayers. Notably, employer changes that are
accompanied by a change in occupation appear to diﬀer not very much
from employer mobility without an occupational change, indicating that
occupation-speciﬁc skills play only a minor role at the beginning of a
worker’s career.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the respective results for diﬀerent skill groups.
In this analysis, we only diﬀerentiate between movers and stayers and do
not consider diﬀerent types of job mobility. The ﬁrst noteworthy result is
that the variation of entry wage diﬀerentials is lowest for the high-skilled,
followed by the low- and medium-skilled. Second, for all skill groups, entry
wage diﬀerentials appear to narrow over time, with the convergence being
higher for movers if compared to stayers. Finally, wage convergence is
lowest for low-skilled who stay with their ﬁrst employer, followed by the
medium- and high-skilled.12
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
A sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n4t h eO L Sr e s u l t sr e p o r t e di nT a b l e6m a yb eb i -
ased because of the endogenous nature of the mobility decision. Therefore,
12The detailed estimation results underlying these ﬁgures are available from the authors upon
request.
19we perform the same regression using the instruments described in Sec-
tion 4.2. In particular, we use the industry employment growth rate and
a mass-layoﬀ indicator as instruments for voluntary and involuntary job
mobility, respectively. Both instruments appear to be strong predictors of
the workers’ probability to change jobs. Most importantly, an F-test of
joint signiﬁcance of the instruments suggests that our results do not suﬀer
from a problem of weak instruments. Table 7 shows that the IV results
diﬀer from the respective OLS results. In particular, indirect mobility now
has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on wages ﬁve years after labour market
entry, while staying in the same ﬁrm and direct job-to-job mobility have
a positive eﬀect, with the latter being most beneﬁcial. Figure 6 shows,
however, that these changes in the estimation results do change our con-
clusions concerning wage convergence qualitatively. Using again the 1984
entry cohort as an example, the 11.1% wage disadvantage of this cohort
reduces to 5.8% ﬁve years after labour market entry. Direct and indirect
movers experience a reduction of their initial negative wage diﬀerentials to
1.4% and 1.8%, respectively.
In order to test the robustness of our results, we further addressed the
endogenous nature of the labour market entry decision.13 It might be the
case that in times of unfavourable economic conditions, individuals decide
not to enter the labour market and postpone their career start by getting
further education. We therefore perform a separate analysis for workers
who start working after ﬁnishing their apprenticeship. These workers are
of particular interest because they are not easily able to respond to ﬂuc-
tuations in economic conditions and are thus unlikely to defer the starting
point of their labour market career. The regression results indicate that
workers who start their career after an apprenticeship and who are aﬀected
by positive wage deviations experience almost the same transition proba-
bilities as the full sample. With respect to negative initial wage diﬀeren-
tials, however, apprentices are more likely to separate from their employer.
Being less able to postpone their labour market entry and to avoid poor
match qualities, unfavourable economic conditions have a stronger eﬀect
on their transition probabilities. Estimating the apprentices’ entry wage
diﬀerentials and their reduction within the ﬁrst ﬁve years of labour market
experience leads to very similar results as for the whole sample.
In a second robustness test, we conduct our analysis using the predicted
instead of the actual year of entry, i.e. we use the year the worker should
13The results from the robustness tests are not displayed in this paper. They are available
from the authors upon request.
20have entered the labour market given his age and education.14 Again, this
leads to qualitatively very similar results as for the whole sample. Quanti-
tatively, year of entry eﬀects on wages are found to be somewhat smaller.
This can be explained by the fact that workers who do not postpone their
labour market entry generally ﬁnd jobs with characteristics which are rel-
atively independent of economic conditions. To take an example, workers
who do not postpone their labour market entry in a recession are likely to
have found a relatively good job, i.e. they do not contribute to potential
negative entry eﬀects.
Up to now, we have modeled the eﬀect of the economic situation at the
time of labour market entry on wages in a very general way by using entry
year dummies rather than investigating potential sources of entry wage
diﬀerentials directly. In an attempt to investigate these potential sources of
entry wage diﬀerentials more closely, we exchanged the entry year dummies
Cj in the wage equations (2) and (3) by the unemployment rate as a general
indicator of the labour market situation and the size of the entry cohort as a
supply shock indicator in the year of labour market entry.15 Table 8 shows
that both the unemployment rate and the cohort size at the time of labour
market entry have a negative eﬀect on entry wages and wages ﬁve years after
labor market entry, with the latter being signiﬁcantly smaller. Similarly
to the results discussed above, direct employer changes have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on wages, while indirect job changes do not have a signiﬁcant
impact. Also in accordance with the results reported above, the results
in Table 8 imply that employer changes have a positive eﬀect on wages
irrespective of whether they are accompanied by an occupational change
or not. This positive eﬀect, however, is signiﬁcantly higher for those who
change employers without changing the occupation. Finally, the estimated
coeﬃcients for the interaction variables of the unemployment rate and the
cohort size in the year of labour market entry with the mobility indicators
show that job mobility appears to reduce wage diﬀerentials resulting from
diﬀerent initial labour market conditions.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between entry year eﬀects in wages
and workers’ mobility behaviour early in their career, employing a large
14The results are available from the authors upon request.
15The unemployment rates are measured at the level of the German L¨ ander and come from
the oﬃcial statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency. The cohort size was computed
from the IABS by the authors.
21German administrative panel data set covering the time period from 1975
to 2004. In a ﬁrst step, we model the eﬀect of the economic condition at
the time of labour market entry on the probability of experiencing diﬀer-
ent types of job transitions. Entry wage diﬀerentials are found to be an
important determinant of job mobility. For all types of transitions we can
show that workers aﬀected by poor economic starting conditions are more
likely to separate from their job. For example, workers who earn wages
20% below the mean entry wage face a 6.6% higher risk to directly switch
employers than workers with average starting wages.
In a second step, we investigate whether job mobility contributes to
the mitigation of entry wage diﬀerentials. We ﬁnd that wage diﬀerentials
across entry cohorts decrease with labour market experience. Moreover,
the estimation results show that cohorts with entry wage advantages can
beneﬁt from direct job changes, but are adversely aﬀected by employer
transitions with an intervening unemployment spell. For workers with ini-
tial wage disadvantages, however, job mobility in general increases wages.
The same holds for employer changes with and without an occupational
change, with the later being more beneﬁcial. Furthermore, these results
are similar for diﬀerent skill groups. Finally, the results are robust towards
various sensitivity checks, including the consideration of a potential endo-
geneity problem that emerges from the possibility that mobility is likely to
be correlated with unobserved individual and job characteristics aﬀecting
earnings by applying an instrumental-variable approach.
Overall, our empirical results show that job mobility indeed operates as
an adjustment mechanism that leads to a reduction of wage diﬀerentials
between workers entering the labour market at diﬀerent points in time.
These are good news for those who enter the labour market during the
current economic crisis. Even though they may suﬀer from lower entry
wages, they will experience a faster wage growth in the years to come,
especially if they are mobile.
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26Tables and Figures
Table 1: Year eﬀects in starting wages
Year of (1) (2) (3)
entry Coeﬀ. (S. D.) Coeﬀ. (S. D.) Coeﬀ. (S. D.)
1980 -0.214* (0.004) -0.152* (0.004) -0.020* (0.004)
1981 -0.217* (0.004) -0.156* (0.004) -0.037* (0.006)
1982 -0.242* (0.005) -0.186* (0.004) -0.081* (0.006)
1983 -0.230* (0.005) -0.184* (0.004) -0.093* (0.005)
1984 -0.225* (0.005) -0.187* (0.004) -0.111* (0.005)
1985 -0.197* (0.005) -0.169* (0.004) -0.106* (0.005)
1986 -0.145* (0.005) -0.122* (0.004) -0.074* (0.004)
1987 -0.113* (0.005) -0.096* (0.004) -0.061* (0.004)
1988 -0.083* (0.005) -0.082* (0.004) -0.061* (0.004)
1989 -0.052* (0.004) -0.057* (0.004) -0.050* (0.004)
1990 0.001 (0.005) -0.013* (0.004) -0.020* (0.004)
1991 0.057* (0.005) 0.038* (0.004) 0.017* (0.004)
1992 0.212* (0.005) 0.180* (0.004) 0.145* (0.004)
1993 0.214* (0.005) 0.191* (0.004) 0.142* (0.005)
1994 0.210* (0.005) 0.178* (0.005) 0.115* (0.005)
1995 0.234* (0.005) 0.186* (0.005) 0.110* (0.006)
1996 0.211* (0.006) 0.177* (0.005) 0.087* (0.006)
1997 0.179* (0.006) 0.146* (0.005) 0.042* (0.006)
1998 0.188* (0.006) 0.138* (0.005) 0.020* (0.007)
1999 0.213* (0.006) 0.169* (0.005) 0.036* (0.007)
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes
Firm charactersitics No Yes Yes
Time Trend No No Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Dependent variable is the log real daily wage. Year eﬀects are calculated as
deviations from the grand mean starting wage. Person cahracteristics include dummy
variables for gender and skill level, while ﬁrm controls include dummy variables for
establishment size and industry. The three speciﬁcations diﬀer by the inclusion of
observable controls only. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level.
27Table 2: Mobility statistics by deviation from mean entry wage
Distribution of entry Experience Worker ﬂow rates
wage diﬀerentials EN EU EE EED EEID EEOS EEOM
1st quintile 1st year 0.242 0.169 0.368 0.235 0.133 0.195 0.173
3rd year 0.162 0.147 0.332 0.224 0.108 0.173 0.159
5th year 0.132 0.116 0.273 0.196 0.077 0.142 0.131
2nd quintile 1st year 0.221 0.102 0.323 0.228 0.095 0.179 0.144
3rd year 0.142 0.103 0.279 0.200 0.079 0.149 0.130
5th year 0.120 0.092 0.235 0.171 0.064 0.123 0.112
3rd quintile 1st year 0.243 0.111 0.313 0.222 0.091 0.167 0.146
3rd year 0.129 0.098 0.267 0.193 0.074 0.141 0.126
5th year 0.122 0.087 0.229 0.168 0.061 0.122 0.107
4th quintile 1st year 0.241 0.107 0.297 0.204 0.093 0.163 0.134
3rd year 0.118 0.094 0.252 0.177 0.075 0.138 0.114
5th year 0.122 0.083 0.214 0.152 0.062 0.116 0.098
5th quintile 1st year 0.220 0.097 0.258 0.176 0.082 0.147 0.111
3rd year 0.108 0.097 0.234 0.156 0.078 0.131 0.103
5th year 0.111 0.078 0.200 0.143 0.057 0.112 0.088
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: The ﬂow deﬁnitions are in Table A.1. The 1st quintile represents the bottom 20% of the wage
distribution, the 5th quintile represents the top 20%.
28Table 3: Entry Wage Diﬀerentials and Job Mobility: Probit Estimation Results
EE EU EN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive wage gap -0.0016* -0.0008* -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0015* -0.0077*
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Negative wage gap 0.0024* 0.0035* 0.0028* 0.0030* 0.0046* 0.0056*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Positive wage gap -0.0004* -0.0003* 0.0008*
*T e n u r e (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Negative wage gap -0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0001*
*T e n u r e (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Gender (Reference: Male)
Female -0.0393* -0.0388* -0.0395* -0.0395* -0.0162* -0.0162*
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Employment Duration (Reference: 0-6 months)
7-12 months -0.1777* -0.1715* -0.0544* -0.0536* -0.0095* -0.0115*
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0003)
13-18 months -0.1925* -0.1812* -0.0895* -0.0885* -0.0094* -0.0133*
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0003)
19-24 months -0.2704* -0.2570* -0.1066* -0.1054* -0.0129* -0.0182*
(0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0003)
25-36 months -0.2985* -0.2785* -0.1274* -0.1256* -0.0106* -0.0190*
(0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0003)
37-60 months -0.3892* -0.3592* -0.1521* -0.1490* 0.0381* 0.0129*
(0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0005)
No. of observations 2,832,804 2,832,804 2,832,804
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level. Each
regression includes industry, establishment size, year, two dummy variables for the skill-level
of the individual and quarterly dummies. EE: employer-to-employer ﬂows, EU: employment-
to-unemployment ﬂows, EN: employment-to-nonparticipation ﬂows, EE
D: direct employer-to-
employer ﬂows, EE
ID: indirect employer-to-employer ﬂows (see Table A.1).
29Table 4: Entry Wage Diﬀerentials, Diﬀerent Types of Job Mobility and Skill
Levels: Probit Estimation Results
Entry Wage All Low- Medium- High-
Gap All skilled skilled skilled
EE Positive -0.0016* -0.0013* -0.0016* -0.0020*
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Negative 0.0024* 0.0002 0.0026* 0.0018*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
EED Positive -0.0011* -0.0009* -0.0012* -0.0016*
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Negative 0.0033* 0.0006* 0.0036* 0.0012*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
EEID Positive -0.0005 -0.0007* -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Negative 0.0016* -0.0002 0.0015 0.0018*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006)
EEOS Positive -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Negative 0.0025* 0.0014* 0.0026* 0.0023*
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005)
EEOM Positive -0.0006* -0.0013* -0.0005* -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Negative 0.0022* 0.0004 0.0024* 0.0026*
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
No. of obs. 2,832,804 537,063 2,114,443 181,298
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least
at the 5%-level. Each regression includes industry, establishment size,
year, and quarterly dummies. EE: employer-to-employer ﬂows, EE
D:d i -
rect employer-to-employer ﬂows, EE
ID: indirect employer-to-employer ﬂows,
EE
OS: employer-to-employer ﬂows without changing occupations, EE
OM:
employer-to-employer ﬂows with changing occupations (see Table A.1).
Table 5: Wage Diﬀerentials Five Years After Labour Market Entry: Descriptive
Analysis
Distribution of entry At entry Five years after entry
wage diﬀerentials Stayer EE EED EEID EEOS EEOM
const. (3rd quintile) 3.775* 4.205* 4.257* 4.262* 4.246* 4.201* 4.313*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
1st quintile -0.710* -0.202* -0.079* -0.065* -0.099* -0.116* -0.044*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
2nd quintile -0.248* -0.066* -0.045* -0.031* -0.051* -0.052* -0.026*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
4th quintile 0.195* 0.065* 0.043* 0.041* 0.051* 0.064* 0.031*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
5th quintile 0.442* 0.197* 0.105* 0.123* 0.103* 0.146* 0.072*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 2. Coeﬃcients are estimated by regressing wage on the 1st, 2nd, 4th and
5th quintile. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level.
30Table 6: OLS-Estimation of entry year eﬀects ﬁve years after labour market
entry
Coeﬀ. (S. D.) Coeﬀ. (S. D.) Coeﬀ. (S. D.)
Stay -0.038* (0.002) EED 0.034* (0.002) EEID 0.003 (0.003)
1980 -0.091* (0.002) 1980·EED 0.038* (0.003) 1980·EEID 0.055* (0.004)
1981 -0.084* (0.002) 1981·EED 0.025* (0.003) 1981·EEID 0.044* (0.004)
1982 -0.101* (0.002) 1982·EED 0.042* (0.003) 1982·EEID 0.060* (0.004)
1983 -0.099* (0.002) 1983·EED 0.061* (0.003) 1983·EEID 0.074* (0.004)
1984 -0.079* (0.002) 1984·EED 0.043* (0.003) 1984·EEID 0.071* (0.005)
1985 -0.058* (0.002) 1985·EED 0.035* (0.003) 1985·EEID 0.048* (0.005)
1986 -0.027* (0.002) 1986·EED 0.030* (0.003) 1986·EEID 0.034* (0.005)
1987 -0.014* (0.002) 1987·EED 0.032* (0.003) 1987·EEID 0.028* (0.005)
1988 -0.002 (0.002) 1988·EED 0.028* (0.003) 1988·EEID 0.029* (0.006)
1989 0.023* (0.002) 1989·EED 0.025* (0.003) 1989·EEID 0.001 (0.006)
1990 0.047* (0.001) 1990·EED 0.005 (0.003) 1990·EEID -0.035* (0.004)
1991 0.052* (0.002) 1991·EED -0.011* (0.003) 1991·EEID -0.013* (0.006)
1992 0.086* (0.002) 1992·EED -0.043* (0.003) 1992·EEID -0.059* (0.005)
1993 0.073* (0.002) 1993·EED -0.055* (0.004) 1993·EEID -0.043* (0.006)
1994 0.062* (0.002) 1994·EED -0.043* (0.004) 1994·EEID -0.059* (0.006)
1995 0.059* (0.002) 1995·EED -0.054* (0.004) 1995·EEID -0.068* (0.006)
1996 0.047* (0.001) 1996·EED -0.045* (0.004) 1996·EEID -0.060* (0.006)
1997 0.037* (0.003) 1997·EED -0.033* (0.004) 1997·EEID -0.038* (0.006)
1998 0.050* (0.003) 1998·EED -0.046* (0.004) 1998·EEID -0.054* (0.006)
1999 0.018* (0.003) 1999·EED -0.033* (0.004) 1999·EEID -0.014* (0.006)
R2: 0.468
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Dependent variable is the log real daily wage. Regression also includes gender, skill
level, establishment size and industry. Entry year eﬀects are calculated as deviations from the
grand mean wage. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level.
31Table 7: IV-Estimation of entry year eﬀects ﬁve years after labour market entry
Coeﬀ. (S. E.) Coeﬀ. (S. E.) Coeﬀ. (S. E.)
Stay 0.089* (0.011) EED 0.100* (0.019) EEID -0.189* (0.018)
1980 -0.076* (0.003) 1980·EED 0.078* (0.008) 1980·EEID 0.064* (0.010)
1981 -0.095* (0.004) 1981·EED 0.084* (0.008) 1981·EEID 0.062* (0.010)
1982 -0.102* (0.004) 1982·EED 0.088* (0.009) 1982·EEID 0.059* (0.011)
1983 -0.083* (0.004) 1983·EED 0.060* (0.009) 1983·EEID 0.045* (0.011)
1984 -0.058* (0.003) 1984·EED 0.044* (0.008) 1984·EEID 0.040* (0.011)
1985 -0.056* (0.003) 1985·EED 0.010 (0.009) 1985·EEID 0.028* (0.011)
1986 -0.036* (0.003) 1986·EED -0.016* (0.008) 1986·EEID 0.040* (0.011)
1987 -0.011* (0.003) 1987·EED -0.015* (0.008) 1987·EEID 0.031* (0.012)
1988 -0.010* (0.003) 1988·EED 0.000 (0.009) 1988·EEID 0.026† (0.012)
1989 0.003 (0.002) 1989·EED 0.004 (0.008) 1989·EEID 0.019† (0.011)
1990 0.018* (0.003) 1990·EED -0.007 (0.009) 1990·EEID 0.011 (0.012)
1991 0.025* (0.003) 1991·EED -0.015† (0.009) 1991·EEID 0.008 (0.012)
1992 0.036* (0.003) 1992·EED -0.025* (0.010) 1992·EEID -0.013 (0.012)
1993 0.059* (0.003) 1993·EED -0.019† (0.011) 1993·EEID -0.047* (0.013)
1994 0.070* (0.004) 1994·EED -0.026* (0.011) 1994·EEID -0.049* (0.014)
1995 0.082* (0.004) 1995·EED -0.035* (0.011) 1995·EEID -0.067* (0.014)
1996 0.084* (0.004) 1996·EED -0.048* (0.011) 1996·EEID -0.086* (0.015)
1997 0.067* (0.003) 1997·EED -0.051* (0.012) 1997·EEID -0.078* (0.014)
1998 0.043* (0.003) 1998·EED -0.050* (0.011) 1998·EEID -0.075* (0.014)
1999 0.040* (0.003) 1999·EED -0.063* (0.011) 1999·EEID -0.017 (0.014)
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic: 44.62
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 6. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level. †: statistically
signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level.
Table 8: Estimation of unemployment rate and cohort size on wages
At entry After 5 years
Coeﬀ. (S. E.) Coeﬀ. (S. E.) Coeﬀ. (S. E.)
Unemployment -0.01837* (0.00044) -0.00557* (0.00020) -0.00506* (0.00052)





Cohort Size·EED 0.00001 (0.00001)





Cohort Size·EEOS 0.00002* (0.00001)
Cohort Size·EEOM 0.00002* (0.00001)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Dependent variable is the log real daily wage. Regression also includes gender, skill level,
establishment size and industry. *: statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5%-level.
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year
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: The grey broken lines show the evolution of wages for cohorts entering the labour
market between 1980 and 1999. The black solid and the black broken lines show cohort
wages at labour market entry and ﬁve years after labour market entry, respectively.














































1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
entry year
intial wage differentials GDP growth
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: Wages are detrended by using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. Following Ravn and
Uhlig (2002) we apply a HP smoothing parameter value of 6.25 for our yearly data.
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OLS estimation
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 6.
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OLS estimation
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 6.













































Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 6.
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IV estimation
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table 6.
35Appendix
Table A.1: Deﬁnition of characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Deﬁnition
EU ﬂows 0.0645 0.2456 Transitions from employment to unemployment.
EN ﬂows 0.1208 0.3252 Transitions from employment to nonparticipation.
EE 0.1625 0.3807 Transitions from one employer to another.
EED ﬂows 0.1158 0.3201 Direct EE ﬂows and EE ﬂows with an intervening
nonemployment spell < 1m o n t h .
EEID ﬂows 0.0467 0.2107 EE ﬂows with an intervening nonemployment spell
≥ 1m o n t h .
EEOS ﬂows 0.0894 0.2951 EE ﬂow without changing occupation.
EEOM ﬂows 0.0731 0.2706 EE ﬂow with changing occupation.
Age 22.413 3.0156 Age of individual.
Low-skilled 0.1767 0.3785 Dummy=1 if individual holds a lower secondary
school diploma without a professional degree.
Medium-skilled 0.7601 0.4260 Dummy=1 if individual has a lower secondary
school diploma and professional degree; or a high
school diploma and without a professional degree;
or a school diploma as well as a professional de-
gree.
High-skilled 0.0632 0.2364 Dummy=1 if individual holds a university degree
or university of applied sciences degree.
Industry dummies 0.0225 0.1451 Agriculture, Mining and Energy
0.2986 0.4434 Production
0.0918 0.2875 Construction
0.2624 0.4571 Trade, Transport
0.2875 0.4563 Services
0.0372 0.1901 State.
Establishment size dummies 0.3101 0.4580 1-19 employees
0.2539 0.4387 20-99 employees
0.2785 0.4399 100-999 employees
0.1575 0.3931 more than 1000 employees
Entry Wage 39.725 16.368 Real daily wage at the time of labour market entry.
Wage 55.481 24.176 Real daily wage.
Positive wage gap 0.0667 0.0952 Positive deviation from grand mean starting wage.
Negative wage gap 0.1015 0.0983 Negative deviation from grand mean starting
wage.
Unemployment 7.8923 2.6505 Federal unemployment rate in the year of labour
market entry (in %).
Cohort size 10073.2 1884.1 Size of entry cohort in the year of labour market
entry.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
36Table A.2: Cohort characteristics at labour market entry
Year of Characteristics
entry Age Female Low-skill Med.-skill High-skill Cohort size
1980 19.76 (2.64) 0.46 (0.50) 0.28 (0.45) 0.68 (0.47) 0.04 (0.20) 13314 (0)
1981 19.72 (2.40) 0.45 (0.50) 0.25 (0.43) 0.71 (0.45) 0.04 (0.19) 12310 (0)
1982 19.92 (2.40) 0.45 (0.50) 0.21 (0.41) 0.75 (0.44) 0.04 (0.19) 10962 (0)
1983 20.06 (2.45) 0.46 (0.50) 0.20 (0.40) 0.75 (0.43) 0.04 (0.21) 10416 (0)
1984 20.14 (2.40) 0.45 (0.50) 0.20 (0.40) 0.75 (0.43) 0.04 (0.20) 10470 (0)
1985 20.40 (2.53) 0.46 (0.50) 0.19 (0.40) 0.75 (0.43) 0.05 (0.22) 10592 (0)
1986 20.56 (2.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.17 (0.38) 0.78 (0.42) 0.05 (0.21) 11647 (0)
1987 20.75 (2.54) 0.47 (0.50) 0.17 (0.37) 0.78 (0.41) 0.05 (0.22) 11702 (0)
1988 20.91 (2.60) 0.46 (0.50) 0.17 (0.37) 0.78 (0.42) 0.05 (0.22) 11362 (0)
1989 21.02 (2.64) 0.46 (0.50) 0.17 (0.37) 0.77 (0.42) 0.06 (0.24) 12060 (0)
1990 21.14 (2.67) 0.47 (0.50) 0.16 (0.37) 0.77 (0.42) 0.06 (0.24) 11739 (0)
1991 21.39 (2.80) 0.48 (0.50) 0.16 (0.37) 0.77 (0.42) 0.07 (0.25) 10689 (0)
1992 21.67 (2.86) 0.49 (0.50) 0.15 (0.35) 0.78 (0.41) 0.07 (0.26) 10376 (0)
1993 21.63 (2.82) 0.48 (0.50) 0.13 (0.33) 0.80 (0.40) 0.07 (0.26) 8602 (0)
1994 21.65 (2.88) 0.47 (0.50) 0.14 (0.34) 0.78 (0.41) 0.08 (0.27) 7822 (0)
1995 21.72 (2.94) 0.44 (0.50) 0.15 (0.36) 0.76 (0.42) 0.08 (0.28) 7596 (0)
1996 21.69 (2.92) 0.47 (0.50) 0.14 (0.34) 0.78 (0.42) 0.08 (0.27) 6716 (0)
1997 21.78 (2.93) 0.46 (0.50) 0.15 (0.35) 0.77 (0.42) 0.08 (0.27) 6873 (0)
1998 21.87 (3.04) 0.47 (0.50) 0.16 (0.37) 0.74 (0.44) 0.09 (0.29) 7016 (0)
1999 21.68 (2.86) 0.45 (0.50) 0.17 (0.38) 0.75 (0.44) 0.08 (0.26) 6800 (0)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.







1980 0.367 0.633 0.352 0.130 0.151 0.231 0.402
1981 0.373 0.628 0.334 0.141 0.153 0.243 0.385
1982 0.385 0.615 0.332 0.138 0.145 0.245 0.370
1983 0.398 0.602 0.323 0.134 0.145 0.245 0.357
1984 0.401 0.599 0.344 0.113 0.142 0.238 0.361
1985 0.410 0.591 0.353 0.101 0.137 0.233 0.358
1986 0.423 0.578 0.352 0.087 0.139 0.243 0.335
1987 0.430 0.570 0.355 0.086 0.129 0.248 0.322
1988 0.446 0.555 0.356 0.077 0.122 0.234 0.321
1989 0.448 0.552 0.356 0.072 0.124 0.233 0.319
1990 0.429 0.571 0.374 0.071 0.126 0.250 0.321
1991 0.439 0.561 0.353 0.092 0.116 0.248 0.313
1992 0.437 0.562 0.349 0.094 0.119 0.274 0.288
1993 0.425 0.576 0.345 0.101 0.130 0.271 0.305
1994 0.428 0.573 0.347 0.097 0.129 0.264 0.309
1995 0.436 0.564 0.333 0.102 0.129 0.244 0.320
1996 0.440 0.561 0.330 0.098 0.133 0.259 0.302
1997 0.431 0.570 0.348 0.095 0.127 0.246 0.324
1998 0.457 0.544 0.325 0.096 0.123 0.244 0.300
1999 0.429 0.571 0.362 0.092 0.117 0.256 0.315
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: The ﬂow deﬁnitions are in Table A.1.
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